1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS	
3	WACO DIVISION	
4	AMERICAN PATENTS, LLC	*
5	VS.	* * CIVIL ACTION NO. W-18-CV-339
6	MEDIATEK, INC, ET AL	* * May 30, 2019
7	·	<del>-</del>
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ALAN D ALBRIGHT, JUDGE PRESIDING  MOTION HEARING	
9	APPEARANCES:	
10	For the Plaintiff:	Stafford Grigsby Helm Davis, Esq. The Stafford Davis Firm, PC
11		The People's Petroleum Building 102 North College Ave, 13th Floor
12		Tyler, TX 75702
13		Larry D. Thompson, Esq. Zachariah Harrington, Esq.
14		Antonelli, Harrington Thompson LLP 4306 Yoakum Blvd., Suite 450
15		Houston, TX 77006
16	For the Defendants:	Eric H. Findlay, Esq. Findlay Craft, P.C.
17		102 N. College Ave, Suite 900 Tyler, TX 75702
18		Lai L. Yip, Esq.
19		Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
20		Four Embarcadero Ctr, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111
21		Martin R. Bader, Esq.
22		Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
23		12275 El Camino Re al Suite 200 San Diego, CA 92130
24		
25		

Case 6:18-cv-00339-ADA Document 113 Filed 06/13/19 Page 2 of 53 Court Reporter: Kristie M. Davis United States District Court PO Box 20994 Waco, Texas 76702-0994 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription. 

- 1 (May 30, 2019, 10:31 a.m.) DEPUTY CLERK: Pending motion hearing in Civil Action 2 3 W-18-CV-339, styled American Patents, LLC vs. Mediatek, 4 Incorporated, et al. THE COURT: Good morning. If counsel would do two things. 5 6 If you would introduce everyone who is in attendance, and if you also would be kind enough as to tell me who the folks are 7 that will primarily be speaking as well. 8 9 MR. DAVIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Stafford Davis on behalf of plaintiff American Patents, LLC. With me are Zack 10 11 Harrington and Larry Thompson, and they will both be speaking 12 on behalf of plaintiff. 13 THE COURT: Very good. 14 MR. FINDLAY: Good morning, Your Honor. Eric Findlay, 15 along with Martin Bader and Lai Yip on behalf of Lenovo 16 defendants, and Mr. Bader will be handling customer suit sever and stay motion, and Ms. Yip will be handling the 17 18 jurisdictional issues. 19 THE COURT: Very good. 20 MR. FINDLAY: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: And since these are the defendants' motions, 2.2 I'll hear from the defendant first. 23 And you're welcome to come up. 24 Just so everyone knows, I have read -- you're welcome to
  - repeat anything or say anything you think is important, but I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

U.S. is the correct entity?

have both read everything that you submitted and I have some understanding of generally what it is you're -- obviously what you're talking about without needing to go too much into the background. Thank you, Your Honor. I took the liberty of preparing some demonstratives for your reference. May I approach? THE COURT: Absolutely. MS. YIP: Good morning, Your Honor. The Court issues in this case really boil down to this: Plaintiff sued the wrong entities. They sued two foreign companies which do not place the accused products into the stream of commerce either in Texas or anywhere else in the U.S., and, meanwhile, the company that does place the accused products into the stream of commerce, Lenovo U.S., is not a foreign entity, is located in North Carolina and is unnamed. THE COURT: So is it your position that if they were to substitute in Lenovo U.S., Lenovo U.S. would not have the ability to argue that they didn't -- forgetting whether it should be here in Waco or not. I'm not talking about that, but you're saying -- and obviously you're not saying Lenovo U.S. is infringing. I'm just saying -- but your position is that the two Lenovo entities that were sued by the plaintiff should be dismissed, they're not the correct entities, and the Lenovo

1 MS. YIP: Correct. Yes.

THE COURT: Very good.

2.2

MS. YIP: That is our position. And, yes. We reserve the right to challenge venue, but the Lenovo U.S. entity would be the correct entity here in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. YIP: So Lenovo U.S. operates independently, and it is neither directed nor controlled by the foreign Lenovo entities with respect to the accused products. Lenovo U.S.'s chief financial officer, Kurt Cranor, provided extensive testimony on all of this. Plaintiff demanded the deposition of Mr. Cranor multiple times and received it, and after a full day of questioning Mr. Cranor, plaintiff is still unable to present evidence that would establish jurisdiction under any theory, whether it's a stream of commerce theory or an agency theory, and under any burden, whether it's a prima facie burden or a preponderance burden.

THE COURT: Can I ask you a completely irrelevant question? We have two interns here. And I was thinking yesterday when they were watching lawyers that they would do much better by getting to sit up here or over there and watch you all do your arguments than sitting back there because you're obviously very competent counsel, and I'm looking forward to hearing from the plaintiff as well. Would you mind if they sat up here and watched from this vantage point?

```
1
         MS. YIP: That would be absolutely fine.
 2
         THE COURT: Why don't you guys come up here?
                                                       This is a
 3
    much better place to listen to good lawyers from.
 4
         MR. FINDLAY: Your Honor, might we -- they might enjoy a
    copy of the slides.
 5
 6
         THE COURT:
                     There you go. Please.
 7
         I'm sorry to interrupt you with that.
 8
         MS. YIP: Oh, no problem at all. Thank you, Your Honor.
 9
         So turning first to the burden issue.
10
         THE COURT: Okay.
         MS. YIP: So we really believe that this dispute over
11
12
    which burden applies is immaterial here because under any
13
    burden, the plaintiff fails. The correct burden is the
14
    preponderance burden because there is no material dispute of
15
    fact, which we will show as we walk through the evidence.
16
         Turning to the prima facie burden. Under a prima facie
17
    burden, uncontroverted allegations are accepted as true, but
18
    here the Lenovo defendants have controverted every allegation.
19
         So, now, with respect to factual disputes, although
20
    factual disputes are resolved in the light most favorable to
21
    the plaintiff, here, because plaintiff's evidence is so weak,
22
    immaterial, irrelevant or nonexistent even in the light most
23
    favorable to plaintiff, the Lenovo defendants should prevail.
24
         Turning now to the stream of commerce issue. The seminal
25
    case here is the Asahi decision from 1987 issued by the U.S.
```

- Supreme Court. I went back and I reviewed every Federal 1 Circuit decision that applied the Asahi test since that 2 3 decision was issued in 1987. The first was issued in 1994, the Beverly Hills Fan case, and the last was 2016, the Polar 4 Electro case. There were 11 decisions in all. 5 In six of those cases the Federal Circuit found no 6 jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. In four of those 7 8 cases the Federal Circuit found jurisdiction but in 9 circumstances that are inapplicable here. And if you look at 10 those decisions, what you see is a pattern emerge. 11 The foreign defendants in those cases all did activities like manufacture, distribution, sales, shipping. The Lenovo 12 13 defendants don't do any of that here. 14 THE COURT: And the name of the -- I'm just trying to make 15 sure our record stays here. We're going to exclude Lenovo U.S. 16 The Lenovo defendants we're talking about here are just the ones that are named in this case? 17 MS. YIP: Yes. That's correct. 18 19 I get that. I just want to make sure the 20 record is clear since we have more than just those Lenovo 21 entities. I want to make sure that that's what we're talking 2.2 about, but I get it. 23 MS. YIP: Yes. Thank you.
- 24 So in the slides we list out all 11 cases for Your Honor's 25 reference. I won't go through all of them here. Cases 1

```
through 6 are the ones in which the Federal Circuit found no
 1
    jurisdiction. Cases 7 through 10 are the ones in which the
 2
 3
    Federal Circuit did find jurisdiction in circumstances that
    don't apply here, and in the eleventh decision, the
 4
    Commissariat case in 2005, the Court found that it needed more
 5
 6
    jurisdictional facts in order to make a determination and that
    the lower court should have granted jurisdictional discovery
 7
 8
    and remanded on that basis, but here obviously --
 9
                     Which case was that?
         THE COURT:
         MS. YIP: The Commissariat case in 2005, which is Case No.
10
    11 in the slides.
11
12
         THE COURT: Okay.
13
         MS. YIP: On Page 20.
         THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.
14
15
         MS. YIP: And so in that case the Court -- the Federal
16
    Circuit remanded for jurisdictional discovery, but here
    jurisdictional discovery has already taken place.
17
18
         Turning now to the application of the stream of commerce
19
    test. When you look at the evidence that the Lenovo
20
    defendants -- the foreign Lenovo defendants have put forth, it
21
    becomes abundantly clear that the Lenovo defendants do not do
22
    any of the things that the Federal Circuit has found are
23
    necessary in order to find jurisdiction under a stream of
24
    commerce theory.
```

Turning to Slide 22, Mr. Cranor was asked by plaintiff's

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

counsel directly whether or not the Lenovo defendants manufacture the accused products. And Mr. Cranor testified under oath that they do not. If you look at plaintiff's rebuttal evidence starting on Page 23, what you see is that here, and actually throughout their opposition briefing, they rely heavily on the foreign Lenovo defendants' annual report. And not only that, the statements that they rely on are very generic. It's worth mentioning as a threshold matter that it is well established that in the jurisdictional context statements in annual reports, SEC filings and the like are extremely weak evidence of jurisdiction. And that has been affirmed over and over again at many district courts and in the regional circuits as well. Turning to Slide 24, the next piece of rebuttal evidence by plaintiff, plaintiff points to evidence from Mr. Cranor stating that there is a This doesn't show which Plaintiff also points to some testimony that , but there are at least nine Hong Kong entities that are part of the Lenovo group

but there are at least nine Hong Kong entities that are part of the Lenovo group of companies.

Turning now to shipment. Mr. Cranor testified at

deposition in response to plaintiff's counsel's questioning

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that the Lenovo defendants do not ship accused products to the U.S. He was unequivocal in this regard. In response --THE COURT: Wait. Just give me one second. I just want to -- okay. I just wanted to read it. Thank you. MS. YIP: Sure. In response, plaintiff's rebuttal evidence is third party data from a company called Import Genius that purportedly identifies Lenovo Shanghai but does not identify accused products. This data was attached to the plaintiff's opposition briefing. It's about seven, eight, nine pages, and if you look through every page, there are no accused products identified. The plaintiff does not present any shipment evidence with respect to LGL, Lenovo Group Limited, the other foreign defendant, the other foreign Lenovo defendant. Turning next to shipment. Slide 27, the Lenovo defendants do not import the accused products into the U.S. Mr. Cranor provided copious testimony on this point. In his declaration he declared under oath that the Lenovo defendants do not import or ship the accused products into the United States, and he was questioned about this again at deposition and he said, again, from an importation perspective, Lenovo United States -- Lenovo United States imports the product. We're listed as the importer of record. The plaintiff has provided no rebuttal evidence in this regard.

THE COURT: I don't know what that means, we're listed as

```
1
    the importer of record. I don't know what that means.
 2
         MS. YIP: So, all importation has an importer. All
 3
    importation activities require an importer of record. And so
    in this case Lenovo U.S. is the importer of record. There may
 4
    be a --
 5
 6
         THE COURT:
                     I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you.
 7
         Let me ask you this: So I'm just making sure I follow
 8
    what Mr. Cranor said. When he says, so whether -- and this is
 9
    on Slide 27. So whether it came from -- regardless, I'll say
10
    of where -- where it was shipped from, we're -- we're is
11
    referring to Lenovo U.S.?
12
         MS. YIP: Correct. Yes. Lenovo U.S. Thank you for the
    question.
13
14
         THE COURT: Okay.
15
         MS. YIP: And, again, the plaintiff has presented no
16
    rebuttal evidence that we have identified in response to this.
17
         THE COURT: Okay.
18
         MS. YIP: And ultimately from a big picture perspective,
19
    Lenovo U.S. is the entity that does everything in the United
20
    States with respect to the products. Lenovo U.S. is an
21
    independently operating entity that controls sourcing,
22
    distribution, marketing, everything relating to presenting the
23
    accused products to the market, to the United States market.
24
         Turning now to the agency theory, which is the only other
25
    theory that plaintiff has presented to the Court to assert
```

jurisdiction. Turning to the standard is an important way to start because it's important to remember that the standard for finding agency in a jurisdiction context is extremely high. It is very difficult to show agency in order to find jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.

The Eastern District of Texas issued a decision in 2016 that is instructive here. This is the Fellowship Filtering case which we cited in our briefing. And in that case the Court said: For an agency relationship to permit imputation of contacts, the parent company's control over the agent must pervade the agent's dealing with the forum. As a result, the typical corporate relationship between a parent and subsidiary, including 100 percent stock ownership and identity of directors and officers, is not a sufficient basis to impute the contacts of a third party to the defendant under an alter ego theory.

So here, even though the Court refers to alter ego, the analysis in the whole decision is about agency.

Turning to Slide 32, the Court also said, even under a theory of imputed contacts, the defendant must deliberately engage in significant activities within a state in order for exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with due process. And you see here that in both instances the Court is citing and relying on regional circuit authority, including Federal Circuit authority which is the Nuance case.

So if you look at the Fellowship case and the facts there,

you'll see a lot of parallels here in our case. In that case the parent company was Alibaba Group and the other entity was a U.S. entity Alibaba.com, Inc.

And there the Court found the context of the parent company should not be imputed to subsidiary and that the evidence plaintiff relies on to support agency demonstrates nothing more than a typical parent/subsidiary corporate relationship.

So just some of the evidence that the Court found to be insufficient to find personal jurisdiction: A tax agreement signed by the director of the parent on behalf of the subsidiary; complete identity of officers and directors, even coupled with other indicia of alter ego status is not a sufficient basis to impute context of a third party to the defendant; deposition testimony indicating that other entities review certain decisions made by the subsidiary and SEC filings indicating that various Alibaba entities have contractual relationships enabling effective control over one another found to be insufficient.

And the Court said, the fact that a parent company may exercise some degree of control over its subsidiaries does not demonstrate that the corporate forum should be disregarded for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, review of certain budget requests or potential business partnerships pursuant to a contractual agreement does not demonstrate parental control

1 that pervades the agent's dealings with Texas. 2 Statements made in SEC filings, also insufficient 3 100 percent ownership of a subsidiary, insufficient 4 evidence. Broad sweeping statements in various SEC filings 5 regarding close integration, insufficient evidence. So all of those facts echo the facts in our case or at least the facts 6 7 that plaintiff purports to rely on in asserting jurisdiction. 8 So plaintiff claims that Lenovo U.S. is the agent of 9 Lenovo Group Limited, LGL, which I'll abbreviate as LGL here. 10 The plaintiff makes no such argument as to Lenovo Shanghai. 11 Plaintiff has not asserted that Lenovo U.S. is the agent of Lenovo Shanghai; however, plaintiff presents no evidence 12 13 showing that LGL's control over Lenovo U.S. pervades its 14 dealings with the forum either in Texas or any other forum. 15 Turning to Slide 37, plaintiff's counsel had ample 16 opportunity, a full day, to depose Mr. Cranor, and Mr. Cranor 17 testified over and over again that 18 19 20 21 He testified: 22 23 24 25

1 And it's important here to remember that Mr. Cranor is not 2 just any Lenovo U.S. employee. He is the chief financial 3 officer. He has been at the company for 14 years, 14 years in senior management or executive roles. His knowledge of the 4 5 company and what it does in the United States is virtually unparalleled at Lenovo U.S. 6 7 Turning now to the next piece of evidence for Lenovo 8 defendants' evidence. On Slide 38, again, at this full day 9 deposition, Mr. Cranor testified that 10 11 He testified: 12 13 14 15 And, in fact, it is 16 not. 17 Next, plaintiff's counsel asked numerous questions regarding contractual 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff's counsel asked: 2.2 23 Answer: 24 25 Answer:

He was also asked:

And he said .

So what we see here, again, is repeated consistent testimony that

Now, turning to plaintiff's rebuttal testimony, what we see here is testimony -- is rebuttal evidence. Excuse me.

What we see here is evidence that is extremely weak, immaterial and irrelevant. It certainly does not show pervasive control by LGL over Lenovo U.S. as is required to show jurisdiction under an agency theory. Plaintiff's evidence is that Lenovo U.S. is a wholly owned subsidiary of LGL.

This was addressed in the Fellowship case, and there the Court said, even 100 percent ownership of a subsidiary is not a sufficient basis to disregard the corporate forum. Plaintiff's evidence, statements in the annual report purportedly showing the group has control over subsidiaries. And it's important here to point out that especially in the briefing there has been a lot of -- in the evidence that has been attached to the briefing and in the briefing itself, there's been a lot of reference to Lenovo Group and/or we or our with no context as to which entities these actually refer to, and in fact, if you look at the way Group is defined in the annual report that plaintiff relies on so heavily, Group is not defined as Lenovo Group Limited. It's actually defined as the whole group of

companies.

In any event, these statements are immaterial as a matter of law because the Fellowship case said, broad sweeping statements made in various SEC filings indicating that in that case the Alibaba entities are closely integrated do not counsel in favor of disregarding the corporate forum.

Next, plaintiff's rebuttal evidence is that Lenovo U.S. employees, specifically Mr. Zielinski, Mr. Skaugen and Ms. Quatela, purportedly report up to officers of LGL, but this is just completely immaterial and irrelevant because Mr. Cranor already testified that

13 He also testified that

in response to plaintiff's counsel's question at the deposition.

In the Fellowship case and a case that plaintiff's counsel relies on, the PPA case out of the Western District of Washington, both make clear that the facts here or the facts that the plaintiff purports to rely on regarding reporting up to officers of the parent are insufficient to show agency for jurisdiction.

Next, plaintiff relies on a third party article published be PricewaterhouseCoopers calling Lenovo U.S. a headquarters.

It's frankly difficult to understand how this is relevant at

all to the agency theory. Being called a headquarters by a third party does not show LGL's control over Lenovo U.S. and certainly does not show pervasive control.

Next, plaintiff relies on Lenovo U.S.'s sales being reported in the consolidated annual report. The PPA case, again, one that plaintiff itself relied on said: Consolidation of subsidiary's activities into parent company's reports is insufficient to support agency -- support an agency relationship. We also cited a case, the Hildebrandt case in our opening brief that defines the same thing.

Plaintiff also relies on some testimony regarding

, and plaintiff claims that this shows

14 agency because

This evidence is extremely weak and irrelevant and, frankly, illogical. It is really quite common for companies to make all

17 kinds of decisions

18 It certainly does not show that

establishes that Lenovo U.S. is a very, very large operating company with many thousands of employees.

Next, plaintiff relies on evidence that -- more of an argument than evidence, that LGL, Lenovo U.S. and Lenovo Shanghai are purportedly indistinguishable to consumers and, therefore, consumers must be confused.

First, it's irrelevant as a matter of law because consumers are simply buying an end product and have no reason to distinguish between various corporate entities, and it doesn't show pervasive control in any event. And it's worth noting that the British Telecomm's case which plaintiff relies on -- actually plaintiff relies on this case really extensively in its supplemental brief. And the British Telecomm's case, which is a case out of Delaware, it's not a jurisdiction case. It's a case about vicarious liability under an agency theory. And in any event, the plaintiff cites British Telecomms for the proposition that consumer confusion suggests an agency -- suggests an agency relationship, and, in fact, the case doesn't say anything about that.

Plaintiff also relies on testimony from Mr. Cranor. So at the deposition plaintiff

2.2

Plaintiff

uses this testimony to argue that consumers must be confused about the various Lenovo entities and are unable to distinguish between them.

First of all, as I previously mentioned, plaintiff has cited no case law that would suggest that consumer confusion suggests agency. Consumer confusion is a concept that is very important in trademark law, but there is no authority here that

plaintiff has cited that would suggest that it's a material consideration in the agency context. And in any event,

Mr. Cranor saying

does not show that any consumer is confused and in fact doesn't even show that Mr. Cranor is confused. And, most importantly, it doesn't show pervasive control by LGL over Lenovo U.S., which is the standard.

Next, plaintiff relies on the annual report again and its references to we, our and us. Plaintiff's argument is that because the Lenovo entities refer to themselves collectively that they must be agents of each other. That appears to be the argument that they are making, but, again, in the Fellowship case the Court found that there is no jurisdiction on the basis that Alibaba Group holds out its U.S. subsidiary as being part of a tightly integrated Alibaba group.

So that is really the sum total of plaintiff's rebuttal evidence. And what we see here is that even under a prima facie burden of proof, even in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is unable to establish jurisdiction. Every single piece of plaintiff's evidence is either immaterial as a matter of law, extremely weak, irrelevant or just don't make any sense.

Turning now to the jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). So this is plaintiff's catch-all jurisdictional theory that is completely premised on the success of the other two theories.

Rule 4(k)(2) permits the assertion of the exercise of jurisdiction where the minimum contacts of the foreign defendant are sufficient with the United States as a whole even if not with respect to any particular forum. But, as we showed, plaintiff is unable to show minimum contacts under either stream of commerce theory or an agency theory in any forum anywhere in the U.S. and, therefore, it cannot be that there are minimum contacts with the U.S. as a whole.

And, finally, with respect to whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable or unfair, the Federal Circuit has said that showing that the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable or unfair only shifts to the defendant if the plaintiff shows first that there are minimum contacts by the foreign defendant in the forum. And here, because the plaintiff has never made the showing, the burden never shifts to the defendants. If the burden were to shift to defendants, certainly the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair given that the foreign defendants are not operating in the U.S., operate thousands of miles away, and there is another entity, Lenovo U.S., which would be the correct defendant here.

And if the Lenovo defendants were dismissed and our motion were to be granted, it is very important to remember that the plaintiff would not be without a remedy. The plaintiff could still name Lenovo U.S. In many of the cases in which motions

```
1
    to dismiss are granted, there are not even other entities for
 2
    the plaintiff to name. The plaintiff is left with no one to
 3
    sue, but here that's not true. The plaintiff has a remedy.
         Your Honor, if there's any questions that you have that I
 4
 5
    can answer, I would be happy to answer them.
 6
         THE COURT:
                     No.
                          I think that was a very good
 7
    presentation.
         MS. YIP: Thank you, Your Honor.
 8
 9
         THE COURT: Very good. Thank you, ma'am. And I'll give
    you a chance after plaintiff's counsel is done to come back up.
10
11
         MS. YIP: Thank you.
         MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, may I approach with copies of
12
13
    my presentation?
14
         THE COURT: Of course.
15
         MR. THOMPSON: Again, Larry Thompson, Your Honor, for
16
    plaintiff.
17
         THE COURT: Yes, sir.
18
                        There's one point that I want to address,
         MR. THOMPSON:
19
    you know, right off the bat before I get into our presentation.
20
    Lenovo's counsel made quite clear their opinion that Lenovo
21
    U.S. is the only proper party in this case, but Lenovo U.S.
22
    doesn't make the accused products. They don't ship the accused
23
    products to the United States. And Lenovo doesn't want to tell
24
    us or the Court who actually does that. And that's important
25
    here because what we do know and what's beyond reasonable
```

```
1
    dispute here is that a foreign Lenovo company makes the accused
    products, distributes the accused products to the U.S., sells
 2
 3
    the accused products to Lenovo U.S., which
 4
 5
                                   , and then Lenovo U.S. then
    sells those accused products to retailers and customers
 6
    nationwide, including in Texas.
 7
 8
         THE COURT: Did you ask Mr. Cranor that question,
 9
10
                              He said
         MR. THOMPSON: Yes.
11
                                               , but that was
12
    based solely off the investigation that Lenovo counsel
13
    performed and reported to him. And we were not able to
    actually even inquire to the details of that investigation
14
15
    based on objections of privilege at the deposition.
16
         THE COURT: Okay. And is your position here today that
    you want to be able to take discovery to find that out?
17
18
         MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I think we only need additional
19
    discovery if we are unable to convince the Court that we've
20
    carried our burden, and I think we have carried our burden on
21
    this record right now.
2.2
         THE COURT: Okay.
23
         MR. THOMPSON: But I think at the very minimum there are
24
    factual issues that certainly could be answered in discovery.
25
    Right? You know, the contract between Lenovo U.S. and the
```

person they buy the products from, the actual information on which Lenovo company makes the accused products. I mean, there are all sorts of things that could be answered very readily in discovery, but under the prima facie standard, we're entitled to get the benefit of all inferences from the current evidence. So even if it's not crystal clear or certain that the defendants are the people involved in this behavior, so long as the Court can infer from the evidence that they likely are, then that's enough for us to win right now.

THE COURT: Okay.

ind cooki. Chay.

MR. THOMPSON: And so, again, going through what I was saying earlier, we know that a foreign Lenovo defendant is -- I'm sorry -- a foreign Lenovo company is engaged in all the key activities overseas. All that we don't know, all that we're not 100 percent certain on is whether it's the defendants or some other foreign Lenovo company that Lenovo Group controls.

The best and most reasonable inference to take from the current record is that Lenovo Shanghai and Lenovo Group are the companies who make the accused products overseas, who distribute the products to the U.S., who sell the accused products to their in the U.S. and who oversee and supervise the distribution of those products to retailers and customers.

THE COURT: I am curious why when Lenovo is telling you that you can sue another Lenovo entity, why you would be

```
1
    uninterested in doing that.
         MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, we're not uninterested in suing
 2
 3
    Lenovo U.S., but we do have a case involving several other
 4
    defendants on the same technology for you in this Court.
 5
         THE COURT: Right.
 6
         MR. THOMPSON: And Lenovo U.S. very likely will have a
 7
    defense under the TC Heartland for improper venue, and, you
 8
    know, Ms. Yip reserved that.
 9
         THE COURT: Right.
10
         MR. THOMPSON: And so the question about going after
    Lenovo U.S. is that we would not potentially be able to do it
11
12
    in this Court.
13
         THE COURT: I get that.
         MR. THOMPSON: Which would, you know, worsen judicial
14
15
    economy, obviously be more expensive for us, and so -- and I
16
    think, more importantly, we learned from the Cranor deposition
17
    that
18
                                                              Ι
19
    mean, Mr. Cranor
20
21
                                 And so there's all sorts of
22
    information here that Lenovo Group, Lenovo Shanghai are in a
23
    much better position to provide than Lenovo U.S. is.
24
         THE REPORTER: Counsel, I need you to slow down.
25
         MR. THOMPSON: I'm sorry. Thank you.
```

So the facts that can be inferred from the current record are easily enough to support jurisdiction.

Now, if we were actually wrong about defendants and they didn't actually engage in the activity that we believe they do, I mean, it would have been the easiest thing in the world for them to come forward with actual evidence, with documents and from witnesses from their affiliates who actually do these activities. They have not done so and their failure to do so speaks volumes. And Your Honor's entitled to infer from that refusal that the evidence they're not providing would have been harmful and would have helped us carry our burden.

In addition, Lenovo hasn't directly controverted our allegations or evidence about foreign activities with any competent evidence. I mean, the only evidence they provided --well, actually with the original briefing and the original declarations, Mr. Cranor said nothing about what the defendants do overseas, which is, you know, obviously the key activity for the stream of commerce theory. Only in the deposition did he

. And we cited cases, Your Honor, to show that that cannot be used to refute our allegations or evidence in this proceeding.

So then beyond that, you know, Lenovo spends I think most of its argument trying to point out that the evidence we're relying on is circumstantial, but they don't make any argument or provide any proof as to why the inferences we're drawing are unreasonable. Right? I mean, they could do that. I mean, they could find some evidence that, you know, Lenovo Group has no manufacturing capabilities or that someone else actually does it, but they haven't done that. And in light of what we have, those inferences are perfectly reasonable and in fact are the most reasonable inferences.

So, you know, Lenovo's motion to dismiss should be denied on this record at this stage. Lenovo cannot win on the law, and they should not win as a matter of policy.

So I'd like to turn to Slide 2, Your Honor. And so, again, we have three theories of jurisdiction that we presented in the papers, direct contacts with the forum, stream of commerce contacts and agency based contacts. For the presentation I'll be focussing on direct and stream of commerce contacts for Lenovo Shanghai and stream of commerce and agency contacts for Lenovo Group.

So the next slides go into the burden and standard of proof. It appears that Lenovo has conceded that the prima facie standard is the appropriate one here so I'll skip over that for now.

So I think as a threshold issue, it's important to look at

4(k)(2) because 4(k)(2) is set up -- this is Slide 20, Your 1 2 Honor. Rule 4(k)(2) is set up to make sure that foreign 3 defendants are not able to escape jurisdiction in the U.S. in a U.S. federal court when they do have minimum contact with the 4 U.S. And so here Lenovo has been served and Lenovo has refused 5 to identify any other forum in the U.S. where they could be 6 7 sued in this case. And that means that we now for this case 8 can consider all contacts with the U.S. and not just contacts 9 with Texas. I think that's very important to realize, 10 especially when it comes to Lenovo Shanghai. And this is Slide 22. 11 12 So Lenovo Shanghai obtained certifications that were 13 necessary to sell the accused products in the U.S. They 14 obtained the SEC certification and they obtained certifications 15 from Underwriters Laboratories that are U.S. specific, and 16 without these, the accused products could not be sold in this 17 country. 18 Lenovo's only argument against that evidence is that it 19 doesn't show a tie to Texas, but again, under 4(k)(2), it 20 doesn't have to. All it has to do is show ties to the U.S. and 21 certainly it's sufficient in context for the U.S. as a whole. 22 Now, looking at -- so that's a direct case for Lenovo 23 Shanghai. 24 On Page 23 we talk about the stream of commerce test. 25 it's a very simple test. You asked if the defendants' products

are being sold to a nationwide distribution network and because of that are available in the forum. The second and third elements here are really, I think, beyond dispute. What's really going on here is Lenovo is saying that the accused products are not really their products. Right? And at a broad level this is Lenovo trying to have it both ways. I mean, when they talk to investors, they include the revenues and profits from these products in order to make their stock more valuable, but now that they're in court, they deny any role in these products in terms of making them, distributing them or designing them.

And going to some of the actual acts relevant to this theory, the evidence does show that the defendants make the accused products. So this is on Page 25. It kind of summarizes some of the major points. Lenovo's Group annual report states that Lenovo manufactures products. It has global manufacturing operations and actually owns manufacturing facilities.

And Page 26 has another piece of evidence on that ground.

Lenovo manufactures one of the world's widest portfolio

connected products. Now, Lenovo has said, well, statements

like this are not, you know, narrow enough because that could

be any Lenovo company. Well, if we turn to the next slide,

Slide 27, this is the statement from the report that says,

Lenovo has company owned manufacturing capabilities. And so

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

there's no doubt they define company in the report as Lenovo Group Limited. So Lenovo Group Limited, really is the only defendant in this case that actually has -- sorry -- the only foreign Lenovo company that's been identified in the record with any manufacturing capabilities. Mr. Cranor on Slide 28 admitted that On Slide 29 he admitted that , which, again, I think counsel said that Mr. Cranor had unparalleled knowledge, but he's been at Lenovo 14 years and So I don't think his knowledge is unparalleled. But what's important here is that he did say that Well, the record shows that Lenovo Group is a Lenovo company in Hong Kong. That's in Slide 30. I'm sorry. Slide 31, Your Honor. He also acknowledged based off the And what's part of the dispute here has been the records don't list model numbers. They list different types of computer products, you know, desktops, monitors. The dispute's over whether they say tablets or not, but we don't have that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

evidence right now. I mean, Lenovo does, but we haven't had an opportunity to test that. But the inference certainly is, if Lenovo Shanghai is regularly shipping computer products to the U.S. and they're also certifying products for sale in the U.S. that the products they're shipping are likely the products they're certifying. And so I think that's additional evidence of Shanghai's role in shipping products to the U.S. And even beyond the sort of tablet issue, which are the exemplary products in the complaint, the accused products here have not been duly defined. We haven't served our picks yet, and, in fact, one of the products that we've identified is an actual monitor/desktop. It's an all-in-one computer. This is on Slide 35. And there's no reason to think that this wouldn't be covered by one of the categories of imports on the Shanghai records. So another part of the --THE COURT: So with respect to the accused product you show on Slide 35, what is the evidence that this is manufactured or sold by one of the Lenovo defendants? MR. THOMPSON: So, Your Honor, my argument is different here. My argument is that this is a product that has infringing capabilities. THE COURT: Okay. MR. THOMPSON: And that we know that Lenovo Shanghai has records where they're shipping in computer products, including

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

desktops and monitors like this, and it's fair to infer that the products being shipped in are -- the unknown or unspecified products being shipped by Lenovo Shanghai include products like this that also infringe. But, again, you know, we haven't had any chance for documentary discovery, and certainly there could be some additional information from Lenovo that might -- that might shed light on that, but, again, Lenovo has not provided anything itself to show that someone else is shipping this product. So, again, going to the established distribution network, it's clear from the record that the Lenovo defendants are part of a distribution network that's designed to access a U.S. market. Again, Mr. Cranor admitted that , and Slide 37 has two of the most useful excerpts on that point. For example, the question was: The answer: And that is not only evidence of an established distribution network, but it's also, I think, you know, categorically what you would expect from an agency relationship.

So on Slide 38 we have some testimony that confirms also

And on Slide 39 we have testimony showing that the

And then finally we have evidence on Slide 40 from the briefing of the accused products are available for sale nationwide and in Texas.

So, Your Honor, I think there is really no dispute that the stream of commerce theory supports either defendant.

Your Honor, do you have any questions on that theory so far?

17 THE COURT: I'm good.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. So turning to the agency theory -Well, there actually is one thing I wanted to discuss,
Your Honor. I mentioned earlier how Lenovo's only evidence
that controverts our allegations in evidence are the hearsay
based statements of Mr. Cranor. And on Slide 46 we, you know,
go through some of the cases that show that they're not able to
use that sort of evidence, you know, to defeat our
jurisdictional motion.

Now, one of the arguments that Lenovo made in its brief is that somehow Mr. Cranor is different because he was a 30(b)(6) witness, and they cite to a Fifth Circuit case in which the Circuit allowed testimony at trial from someone who was a 30(b)(6) witness in areas outside of his personal knowledge because those are areas that he testified to in deposition. Well, that case was the case in which the plaintiff or the other party was attempting to cross-examine at trial the 30(b)(6) witness. And so it was an adverse party that was using that testimony. The Circuit has made clear though that the -- you know, the party that's propounding the actual witness and who put the witness up for a deposition cannot use his testimony for their own purposes if it's based on hearsay. And that's what Mr. Cranor's testimony is based on, and there's no dispute about that.

So that was on Slide 52.

Now --

THE COURT: Well, let me parse that down a bit. Was the evidence that you're saying he relied on the information that he went out and had got from other Lenovo people to make sure the information was correct, or is this information that you say was provided to him by counsel and counsel said, we're not going to let you get into where the information came from?

MR. THOMPSON: So, Your Honor, the question at the deposition confirmed that Mr. Cranor

1 2 3 4 5 So those are even 6 potentially more flawed. 7 But again Lenovo has the ability to find someone who 8 actually has personal knowledge of this stuff and to put them 9 in or to have Mr. Cranor at least testify about a conversation 10 he had with someone who had personal knowledge or a document 11 that would show what they needed to, and they haven't done that 12 here. 13 THE REPORTER: Counsel, you need to slow down. 14 MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you. Sorry. 15 I think that's important here for -- and given the burden 16 of proof of the prima facie case and how low that is. It's 17 really -- a reason why the burden is so favorable is that it's 18 meant to deal with situations in which they have the evidence 19 and we don't. And that's true here. Even despite the single 20 deposition that we've had, we have no access to their 21 confidential internal documents, and we have to take their word 22 for it, but we've still been able to, based off public 23 discovery, find documents that make it reasonable to think that

they're actually involved in the stream of commerce for the

25 accused products.

24

So, Your Honor, turning to Page 53, we discuss the general tests for agency based jurisdiction, and this is appropriate whenever a corporate parent or affiliate directs or authorizes a subsidiary's jurisdiction conferring acts. Now, this is not an alter ego analysis, and it's not an exercise of jurisdiction based solely on the parent subsidiary relationship.

And at this point I want to talk about this Fellowship
Filtering case that Lenovo cites. And it's clear from the
language that the Court applied in that case that they're
actually applying alter ego standards to this fact pattern, but
maybe even more important for the current factors was that that
decision was only made after an evidentiary hearing with live
testimony. So the Court may have after, you know, hearing
testimony come to different conclusions about what the evidence
shows, but on this record, with the prima facie standard, those
inferences cannot be drawn against us.

So on Page 54 we have a statement from the Supreme Court in Daimler where it talks about how a corporation can, you know, avail itself of a forum by directing its agents or distributors to take action there. And an example given is marketing a product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as a sales agent in the forum.

We also on Slide 55 have an excerpt from the British

Telecomm case with Circuit Judge Bryson writing on this where
he says: The agency theory differs in scope and application

1 | from the alter ego theory. Under the agency theory, total

2 domination or general alter ego criteria need not be proven.

3 Rather, a parent corporation is held liable for the actions of

a subsidiary if the parent directed or authorized those

5 actions.

That's the test. It's not a pervasive theory. It's not a disregarding the corporate forum theory.

On Slide 56 and 57, Your Honor, we list several of the factors that we are applying to show agency, and we list the cases that support that. Without marching through each of these individually, I will comment that Lenovo's strategy largely is to sort of look at these factors individually, find the case in which that factor was not enough to put you over the line of agency and then say the factor is irrelevant here. And here the argument is that all these factors when combined show direction or control.

I'd like to turn to Slide 67, Your Honor, is where we talk about the headquarters in the United States of Lenovo, and, you know, one of the documents that we did cite for this headquarters point was a third party document, but it was based off interviewing Lenovo executives, but even beyond that, this Exhibit CC at the bottom here is from a Lenovo Group press release. So there's independent evidence of them announcing the headquarters status of Lenovo U.S.'s facilities, which, again, I think shows a very direct and very unusual connection

between the parent company and the subsidiary here.

So I'd like to also turn to Slide 70 now, Your Honor, and this is some testimony about the manner

, and this was some testimony that Lenovo's counsel mentioned earlier, but one part of this testimony that was not mentioned is here on Line 20 and 21 here.

The question was:

And the witness answered,

So, again, the is I think a very clear example of directing or authorizing that activity.

Slides 71 and 72 talk about the common branding causing consumer confusion, and this is actually a relevant factor that courts have recognized for agency and for stream of commerce for that manner, and I think the general idea is is that when you're dealing with the public in a way that deliberately prevents the public from knowing which of a corporate family they're actually acting with, then it's fair to say that everyone who potentially is in that relationship is purposely availing themselves of the forum because otherwise it gives the defendant a way to sort of take -- to have the benefit of, you know, doing business in the forum without having to be sued for the consequences of its business. Right? And we have examples here of Mr. Cranor being shown

2.2

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, and you don't have to tell me. I mean that because I don't mean to -- if it's something you don't want to tell me, I would understand why, but how is it that you all decided to sue the two Lenovo entities that you -- how did you select them? And if you don't want to tell me, you don't have to because it's --

MR. THOMPSON: At a high level, I think I can point out that Lenovo Group is clearly the entity in charge of the entire Lenovo organization, and Lenovo is an interesting company where probably more than almost anyone that I've dealt with, they have layers and layers of entities that are involved in ways that are completely opaque from the outside, but based off what we've seen, Lenovo Group is the one who controls everything. So that's why Lenovo Group is in the case.

And Lenovo Shanghai, you know, we found them on the certifications of the accused products that we have in the complaint. And so we felt that that clearly showed that they had a role in the case here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: I would want to end with a discussion about the Court's options if the Court does not actually deny the motion today. I mean, there's discussions starting on Page 79 where we talk about, you know, the general standard for jurisdictional discovery and their cases that have ordered more

```
1
    jurisdictional discovery even when it's been had.
    depends on whether there's any reason to think that discovery
 2
 3
    will lead to more information relevant to a personal
 4
    jurisdiction. I think here the record is abundant with
 5
    situations in which discovery can answer questions that are
 6
    important here.
 7
         And, finally, on Page -- yes. So on Page 83 and 84 we
    have discussion of the Court's ability to, you know, defer this
 8
 9
    issue until later in the case. It may well be that additional
    jurisdictional discovery could be taken with discovery on other
10
    issues in the case, and on Page 84 we've got some discussion of
11
12
    how the Court has the issue to defer this until trial, which
13
    may be helpful as well because there are a lot of issues on
    agency that are going to overlap with our underlying liability
14
15
    theories on infringement, you know, to which we have a right to
16
    trial by jury.
         So unless Your Honor has any questions, I'll sit down.
17
18
         THE COURT:
                     I don't.
19
         MR. THOMPSON: All right. Thank you.
20
         THE COURT: Counsel, I'm sure you have a couple of things
21
    you're eager to respond to, and if you're like me, you want to
22
    get them all done before you forget what it was you were about
23
    to say, but I'm going to screw you up by asking you something I
24
    want to know, and then hopefully you'll be able to get there.
25
    I'm going to let you say whatever you want, but what counsel
```

for plaintiff just said actually was kind of what I was thinking might be the most appropriate thing here. A number of times he said that, you know, the problem he has, which on one level I'm sympathetic to, you know, in being able to get the appropriate information from the Lenovo entities to make sure they are suing the right people. They start off at some disadvantage in that regard. I get that. That's why I asked why they selected the ones they selected.

What would be wrong with allowing them, allowing the plaintiff to have some additional discovery that I would want you all to work out and get approved by me in terms of its scope to give the plaintiff an opportunity to get the information it needed to respond to this motion before I ruled? That is a -- that's probably where I'm leaning at the moment, and I'll let you address that.

MS. YIP: Sure.

THE COURT: By the way, your presentation was very good, and, you know, very persuasive, you know, but my goal is to make sure that while your offer to let them sue Lenovo U.S. is generous, I understand why they might not want to do that unless they have the wrong entities here, and so I'm tempted to allow them to do some discovery in that regard. So if you would address that, and then I'm happy to hear from you on anything else.

MS. YIP: Thank you very much, Your Honor, for the

opportunity to speak again and for your question.

I had anticipated that they would raise the jurisdiction issue, the additional jurisdictional discovery issue and so I prepared some additional demonstratives for your reference on this point if you would not mind me approaching and providing it.

THE COURT: Very impressive.

(Laughter.)

MS. YIP: So there's actually a standard for how we evaluate whether jurisdictional discovery is appropriate. Plaintiff's counsel made it seem like as if it's really a low bar to obtain additional jurisdictional discovery, but that is false.

In our earlier briefing we cited a case from the Western District of Texas that articulates what the standard is, and that's on Page 3 of the second slide presentation, and it says: As the party opposing dismissal and requesting discovery, the plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the necessity of discovery. A plaintiff seeking jurisdictional discovery is expected to identify with particularity the discovery sought, explain what information it expects to obtain, and explain how that information would support the assertion of personal jurisdiction.

Another case on Page 4, the Firefighters case, is also instructive. We cited this in our briefing as well.

Jurisdictional discovery must be denied where plaintiffs have failed to identify what they believe discovery would reveal or how these newly discovered facts would establish personal jurisdiction over named defendant.

And I think that that's really key, that the jurisdiction -- the jurisdictional discovery is regarding the named defendant. The jurisdictional discovery that the plaintiff is seeking regarding who manufactures the products if it's not the foreign Lenovo defendants that are currently named is not jurisdictional discovery that allows us to ascertain jurisdiction over the currently named defendants. And if you look at the way that jurisdictional discovery is ordered in the cases, all the cases that I've seen order jurisdictional discovery about the named defendants. And there are cases out there that say that jurisdictional discovery should not be used as a means for a fishing expedition.

THE COURT: No. No. Let me assure you that's what I'm -I would be limiting the discovery to the named defendants. I
get that. And also my general sense from having sat on the
plaintiff's side occasionally is I don't think the plaintiffs
have really any interest. It's kind of a pyrrhic victory for
me to deny their -- the motion to dismiss here, go all the way
through trial and have them find out that these two entities
don't infringe or don't do what they say. So my sense is,
while you've done a very good job in protecting Lenovo's

interest, and I understand why you would oppose wanting to

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

allow this discovery to take place, I could even imagine the phone call with your client if you had to tell them I permitted this to go forward. I had some of those phone calls too, but it seems to me that the one area where your interest and the plaintiff's interest is aligned 100 percent here is in making sure that Lenovo Group and, I apologize, the other Lenovo entity are the appropriate entities. And I don't see the plaintiff's counsel wanting to spend any more money accomplishing that than the minimal that it would take. all don't want to give them any more discovery than the minimal it would take, and what my hope would be is that you all could, on a fairly rapid basis, come to an agreement on what discovery the plaintiff feels it would need to take from the named defendants only, not a fishing expedition, but it seems to me the plaintiffs have a bigger interest really than you all do in making sure that these are the right entities and not just staying here. And so I think what I'm going to do is I'm going to order that you all get together and have the -- let the plaintiffs tell you what discovery they think would be necessary that is limited to establishing that the two Lenovo entities that are in this lawsuit infringe, and what I mean -- not that they practice it, but I'm saying that they either make, sell or

whatever, and if you all can't come up with -- if you all can't

come up with an agreement as to the scope of that discovery, we can get on a phone call. I'm relatively experienced at this kind of stuff, and I would be happy to get on the phone with you and have you all tell me -- have them tell me what they need that you don't want, and you would tell me why you don't want it and why they shouldn't get it. I think we would be able to resolve it, but I'd like to get that done pretty quickly, and it seems to me fair.

The plaintiffs really have two choices here. They can take your option of suing Lenovo U.S., which you've

take your option of suing Lenovo U.S., which you've indicated -- I'm not saying they would wind up here, but they can do that, or they can invest in the discovery they need to establish a predicate for being here. And it seems to me you all should be able to work out the scope of that discovery, but if you can't -- you're protecting your client, they're protecting theirs -- I'll be happy to get involved in that scope. And all I care about is that you get that done pretty quickly.

And it seems to me that if the plaintiffs are unable to obtain discovery that would satisfy me, it won't satisfy them either that they want to maintain this suit against those two entities. They either have the right to two entities or they don't. So I'll limit it to that, but I assume -- if they were to take depositions, would those depositions be in Asia?

MS. YIP: So, Your Honor, first of all, thank you so much

for your comments. I appreciate them very much.

So actually when we were negotiating the timing of the deposition of the corporate representative that Your Honor had ordered, we had teed up the possibility of a witness located in China, and the plaintiff's counsel did not express any interest in that and repeated their desire to depose Mr. Cranor, and we did make Mr. Cranor available. So a witness in China is a possibility, although we haven't looked into that.

THE COURT: Or somewhere close to there since my recollection is China's not overly hospitable but Macau has some lovely hotels.

MS. YIP: It does. It absolutely does. Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: Hong Kong is nice this time of year.

14 MS. YIP: It's lovely. Yes.

THE COURT: So I've taken depositions in all those places and was grateful to get to go there.

Well, here's what I'm going to do: You all are exceptionally good lawyers. I think you all know the scope of discovery I intend for you all to be allowed to be taken. I understand it would have to be -- it's up to the plaintiffs. I will say probably on the record as it stands now, I would be predisposed towards not keeping this case here on the record that I have. I haven't made up my mind. I think your argument was pretty persuasive. That being said, I want to give the plaintiffs the decision -- they have a decision to make if they

want to take you up on what I would strongly suggest is an 1 offer your client ought to make that someone will be made 2 3 available on behalf of the two named defendants for them to take discovery of to establish that they are infringing. 4 Again, I'm talking about only in terms of make, sell, use, 5 whatever, not proof -- not discovery into proving infringement, 6 7 but really I'll allow the plaintiff to have that opportunity to 8 do that discovery if they want to, and I just would like for it 9 to happen as quickly as possible. MS. YIP: I understand, Your Honor. And, again, I 10 11 appreciate your comments. 12 We certainly share the concern about being forced to 13 litigate -- the Lenovo defendants being forced to litigate this 14 case when in fact they do not have anything to do with the 15 accused products in the United States, and that is certainly 16 the subject of my colleague Martin Bader's motion to sever and 17 stay, and --18 THE COURT: I think if you're correct, the plaintiffs -- I 19 know at least one of the plaintiff's counsel pretty well. I 20 don't think they have any interest in going all the way through 21 this process with your clients if they are able to determine 22 early on that that's a fool's errand. 23 So I'm going to hold off on ruling on these motions until 24 you all are able -- would you all -- do you think you all would 25 be able to get this done within a month?

1 MS. YIP: I think that --

MR. BADER: I think so. However, the folks in China in setting up that deposition are notoriously kind of hard to -
THE COURT: Well, you might tell them that I might -- that I can keep them in here a lot longer and do this later if they think that would be preferable. And so I'm giving them a possible exit out early if it turns out one way. They're not getting out until we have this discovery taken. So it's really -- you can tell them they can -- it's not Chinese New Year. I've been through that too. So tell them they can be as cooperative as they want to be. Waco will be just a fine place for them to be down the road if they're uninterested in going this route.

MR. BADER: Understood. We'll do everything we can to get someone available.

THE COURT: And, seriously, here's the deal: I don't think we've set a Markman in this, have we? You know, y'all want -- I say this collectively -- want to get all this done before -- it's not going to be any additional effort on the plaintiffs to be preparing for the Markman. The sooner you all can get this done and we can get this resolved, the sooner I can either keep you in or let your folks out, and you get out of the wonders of drafting Markman briefs. So tell your clients it's really a business decision of theirs how involved they want to remain in this litigation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. YIP: Your Honor, would it be okay with you if I take one last shot at trying to present some additional thoughts on this issue? THE COURT: I'm pretty comfortable with where I'm at right now. You've done a fabulous job. Like I said, Paul Luckern always said that to me in the ITC, but he said it to everyone and usually it was right after he said something ugly and so I'm not sure that's always a compliment, but I sincerely mean you did a terrific job. Very persuasive. I think the plaintiffs have legitimately raised an issue of they only have so much transparency into what your two clients actually do that might be jurisdictional for a claim of patent infringement, and I want to give them an opportunity -- if -they're not going to spend the money to do it, I wouldn't think, unless they believe in good faith it's worth doing it. I'm actually doing, in my opinion, your client a favor. They may not feel that way. They probably won't tell you that they think it was, but it seems to me there's no better evidence of good faith on the part of the plaintiffs that they believe these two entities belong in the lawsuit than if they are willing to go to China and get the evidence that they believe exists. I think that's a pretty fair resolution of dealing with this. And I'll say this: I'm not telling the plaintiffs they

have to do this. If the plaintiffs decide not to do this,

we'll stand on the record. I'll rule on these motions. If
they tell me they do want to do it, then just -- I would try
and get it done within a month. And if you have any issues
about the scope, I really don't -- the thing I hated the most
was, you know, oh, you can only have three hours, you can have
eight. You know, y'all spend eight hours fighting over the
number of hours. You know, if there are issues like that, just
call me. I'll listen to why they want four days in Macau and
you only want an hour and I will come up with something I think
is a reasonable resolution of that as well. I don't want y'all
spending a lot of time fighting over stuff like that, which I
know occasionally patent lawyers can do.

You know, I've been through all this, and I didn't mind any of it other than the fighting over what was going to happen. I never enjoyed that very much or thought it was very productive. So if you all can't agree to anything, call, and with a song in my heart and great joy, I'll be happy to take the phone call and resolve it for you. Although, I'll say, as always, which I say to my two teenage sons, you are always better off resolving it yourselves in terms of getting what you want. I can be relatively arbitrary in my decision and it doesn't affect me as much.

Thank you all for being here. Everyone did a great job.

This is the greatest job in the world because we've got great lawyers.

```
1
         What do I need to do?
 2
          (Brief off-the-record discussion.)
 3
         THE COURT: The motion to sever? I'm going to hold off on
    the motion to sever until we get this done, if that wasn't
 4
    clear. And so we'll take up the other motion -- I thank you
 5
    for reminding me, but I want to get this done and that may
 6
 7
    obviate the need to take up any of the other motions. I think
 8
    it would.
 9
         MS. YIP: Thank you so much for your time, Your Honor.
10
         THE COURT:
                     Thank you for being here.
11
          (Hearing adjourned at 11:54 a.m.)
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

```
1
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
 2
    WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
 3
         I, Kristie M. Davis, Official Court Reporter for the
 4
 5
    United States District Court, Western District of Texas, do
    certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
 6
 7
    record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
 8
         I certify that the transcript fees and format comply with
 9
    those prescribed by the Court and Judicial Conference of the
10
    United States.
         Certified to by me this 4th day of June 2019.
11
12
                              /s/ Kristie M. Davis
                              KRISTIE M. DAVIS
13
                              Official Court Reporter
14
                              800 Franklin Avenue, Suite 316
                              Waco, Texas 76701
                              (254) 340-6114
15
                              kmdaviscsr@yahoo.com
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```